

# Tiebreak proposals for Swiss tournaments

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Discussions about tiebreaks goes back to as far as 1873 (Ahrends, p. 184). Vivid discussions arose when the famous 1914 Mannheim chess tournament was interrupted by World War One. At that point Alekhine was a half point ahead. But Vidmar did have met stronger opponents. The issue of defining rankings for tournaments has been studied in various fields like sports, psychology, decision theory, Condorcet voting. Many ranking methods based on different motivations have been defined.

## Direct methods

### Solkoff, Buchholz, and variants

The above methods have a practical disadvantage. If a player leaves the tournament early the Solkoff contribution will be flatted in a negative sense. His opponents are thereby disadvantaged. The FIDE has found a solution for this (Forlani). But this solution is complicated and artificial. All direct methods have a fundamental limitation. They do take into account the direct opponents, but not the opponents of the opponents. And the opponents thereof. Four alternative indirect tiebreak methods are presented.

## Relative Elo Ratings

### The normal distribution function

"From general experience in sports we know that the stronger player does not invariably outperform the weaker. A player has good days and bad, good tournaments and bad. By and large at any point in his career, a player will perform around some average level. Deviations from this level occur, large deviations less frequently than small ones. These facts suggest the basic assumption of the Elo system. It is best stated in the formal terms of statistics:"

The many performances of an individual will be normally distributed, when evaluated on an appropriate scale (Elo, 1978, p19).

### Development of the Percentage Expectancy Table

The normal probabilities may be taken directly from the standard tables of the areas under the normal curve, when the difference  $D$  in ratings is expressed as a  $z$  score. The  $z$  value of a difference equals  $D / \sigma$ , where  $\sigma = 2000 / 7$ . For example, let  $D = 160$ . Then  $z = 160 * 7 / 2000 = 0,56$ . The table / formula gives ,7123 and ,2877 as areas of the two portions under the cumulative curve. These numbers represent the expected scores of the two opponents (Elo, p. 158).

In a rating system (KNDB, FMJD) ratings are updated at regular time intervals. Relevant games are considered. Game by game the difference between actual and expected score is established, according to the percentage expectancy function. Then the existing rating is updated, proportional to the total difference between expected and actual score. However, when computing the relative Elo ratings, we do not assume any existing ratings prior to the tournament. All players in the tournament are assigned a rating, the relative Elo rating, such that for each player the expected score and the actual score are equal. This rating is calculated by a numeric iteration procedure, as no closed formula exists. The relative Elo rating of a tournament is unique, up to a constant.

## Example [Open de Sangmelima Cameroon 2014](#)

At the start of the iterations (R0) one assumes all players have equal strength. In the subsequent iterations the rating of each player is updated according to  $-\ln(\text{We}/W) * 2000 / 7$ . "We" is the expected score derived from the cumulative normal distribution, W is the actual score and  $\ln()$  constitutes the natural logarithm function. The updates are normalized to set the sum of all updates to zero. The iteration is slow, but stable. We may choose at start any average rating level including zero. This does not effect the ordering of the players.

Pl	Title	Name	Cn	Rating	+	-	N	Pts	Whl	Wl	R0	We0	Up0	R1	We1	Up1	R2	We2	Up2	Rk	R28	
1	gmi	Leopold Kouomou	cm	2296	3	3	0	6	9	25	34	0,0	6,0	137,7	137,7	8,0	32,6	170,3	8,1	36,2	2	304,0
2		Gerard Ngankou	cm	2265	3	3	0	6	9	25	34	0,0	6,0	137,7	137,7	7,7	42,9	180,6	8,0	38,3	1	312,7
3		Mouanji Iliassou	cm		4	0	2	6	8	16	23	0,0	6,0	104,0	104,0	9,0	-33,9	70,1	8,5	-10,6	6	18,3
4		Armand Abouem	cm		3	1	2	6	7	30	39	0,0	6,0	65,9	65,9	6,0	41,7	107,6	6,5	25,6	3	185,3
5		Landry Nga	cm		1	5	0	6	7	28	37	0,0	6,0	65,9	65,9	6,3	31,1	97,0	6,6	20,5	4	180,9
6	mi	Bruno Fopa	cm	2262	2	3	1	6	7	21	28	0,0	6,0	65,9	65,9	7,7	-28,3	37,5	7,5	-12,8	9	-26,6
7		Desire Ghuendou	cm		2	3	1	6	7	18	25	0,0	6,0	65,9	65,9	8,2	-45,6	20,3	7,6	-17,6	10	-63,0
8		Maturin Tomi	be		2	2	2	6	6	26	35	0,0	6,0	21,8	21,8	6,4	-17,1	4,7	6,0	6,0	5	33,6
9		Arnaud Foto	cm		2	2	2	6	6	25	32	0,0	6,0	21,8	21,8	6,3	-15,9	6,0	6,2	-3,6	8	-19,4
10		Patrick Akono	cm		1	3	2	6	5	31	40	0,0	6,0	-30,3	-30,3	4,4	36,2	5,9	5,2	-5,6	7	-16,3
11		Bernard Mambo	cm		2	0	4	6	4	28	37	0,0	6,0	-94,0	-94,0	3,7	18,8	-75,3	4,2	-8,6	11	102,5
12		David Wabo Daco	cm		1	2	3	6	4	23	31	0,0	6,0	-94,0	-94,0	4,7	-45,7	-139,7	4,1	-3,3	12	177,2
13		Barel Bimogo	cm		1	1	4	6	3	23	31	0,0	6,0	-176,2	-176,2	3,8	-66,9	-243,1	3,1	-5,4	13	299,4
14		Prince Mvondo	cm		1	0	5	6	2	28	37	0,0	6,0	-292,1	-292,1	1,7	50,2	-241,8	2,5	-59,1	14	330,6

It is easy to check the result of the above calculation:

Gerard Ngankou	313,0			Leopold Kouogueu Kouomou	304,0		
Opponents	R28	Diff	We	Opponents	R28	Diff	We
Patrick Akono	-16,3	329,3	1,75	Prince Arnaud Mvondo	-330,6	634,6	1,97
Landry Nga	180,9	132,1	1,36	Maturin Nyamsi Tomi	33,6	270,4	1,66
Maturin Nyamsi Tomi	33,6	279,4	1,67	Patrick Akono	-16,3	320,3	1,74
Bernard Mambo	-102,5	415,5	1,85	Armand Abouem	185,3	118,7	1,32
Leopold Kouogueu Kouomou	304,0	9,0	1,03	Gerard Ngankou	312,7	-8,7	0,98
Armand Abouem	185,3	127,7	1,35	Landry Nga	180,9	123,1	1,33
Expected Score		9,0	points	Expected score		9,0	points

## Domain

The iteration requires an indivisible (that is, strongly connected or irreducible) domain. In every possible partition of players into two nonempty subsets, some player of the second set has defeated at least one player in the first set (Glickman, p. 5). Finding all maximal strongly connected components is a mathematical puzzle in its own right.

Remark: one can introduce a virtual opponent equivalent to all other players to make the domain indivisible.

# Least Squares Method

## Principle

If a player has a win, loss or draw his comparison outcome is set to 1, -1 or 0 respectively. The least-squares method constructs a mean square approximation of the skew symmetric comparison outcomes  $R$  by the differences of the desired least-squares ratings (Cheboratev, 1999, p. 18):

Determine  $q = (q_1, \dots, q_n)$  such that  $\sum_i \sum_j (r_{ij} - (q_i - q_j)) n_{ij}^2$  is a minimum (Gulliksen, 1956)

where

- $n_{ij}$  is the number of games between player  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $i \neq j$ , zero otherwise
- $r_{ij}$  equals the sum of the results of player  $i$  against  $j$

## Calculation

The LSM-ratings ( $q$ ) are a solution of the set of linear equations:

- $L \cdot q = s$
- $\sum q = 0$

where

- $L = (l_{ij})$  is the Laplacian matrix of the game results graph
- $l_{ii} =$  Number of comparisons of player  $i$
- $l_{ij} =$  Negative the number of games between player  $i$  and  $j$ ,  $i \neq j$
- $s = (s_i)$ ,  $s_i = \sum_k r_{ik}$ , row sum of wins minus losses

**Note** that if the percentage expectancy function of the relative Elo ratings is replaced by a linear relationship, for example the "algorithm of 400", then relative Elo ratings are identical to LS-ratings except for a scaling factor. Multiplying LS-ratings with a factor 800 gives a comparable rating in the Elo-domain (FIDE Rating Regulations effective from 1 July 2017, table 8.1b).

## Example Open de Sangmelima Cameroon 2014

Pl	Title	Name	Cn	Rating	+ N	s	WhlWl	Rk	LS-Rtg
1	gmi	Leopold Kouomou	cm	2296	3 6	3	25 34	2	0,643
2		Gerard Ngankou	cm	2265	3 6	3	25 34	1	0,708
3		Mouanji Iliassou	cm		4 6	2	16 23	5	0,059
4		Armand Abouem	cm		3 6	1	30 39	3	0,420
5		Landry Nga	cm		1 6	1	28 37	4	0,392
6	mi	Bruno Fopa	cm	2262	2 6	1	21 28	9	-0,042
7		Desire Ghuendou	cm		2 6	1	18 25	11	-0,122
8		Maturin Tomi	be		2 6	0	26 35	6	0,054
9		Arnaud Foto	cm		2 6	0	25 32	10	-0,047
10		Patrick Akono	cm		1 6	-1	31 40	8	-0,030
11		Bernard Mambo	cm		2 6	-2	28 37	12	-0,234
12		David Wabo Daco	cm		1 6	-2	23 31	13	-0,425
13		Barel Bimogo	cm		1 6	-3	23 31	15	-0,694
14		Prince Mvondo	cm		1 6	-4	28 37	14	-0,683

It is easy to check the result of the above calculation as follows:

Gerard Ngankou	0,708	3	
Opponents	LS-Rtg	Diff	
Patrick Akono	-0,030	0,738	
Landry Nga	0,392	0,316	
Maturin Nyamsi Tomi	0,054	0,654	
Bernard Mambo	-0,234	0,942	
Leopold Kouogueu Kouomou	0,643	0,065	
Armand Abouem	0,420	0,288	
s1		3,00	(Wins minus losses)

Leopold Kouogueu Kouomou	0,643	3	
Opponents	LS-Rtg	Diff	
Prince Arnaud Mvondo	-0,683	1,326	
Maturin Nyamsi Tomi	0,054	0,589	
Patrick Akono	-0,030	0,673	
Armand Abouem	0,420	0,223	
Gerard Ngankou	0,708	-0,065	
Landry Nga	0,392	0,251	+
s2		3,00	(Wins minus losses)

# Recursive Buchholz

Let

- Rb - Recursive Buchholz ratings
- RbOpp - Average Opponents Rb-rating
- s - Score percentage - 50%, or alternatively,
  - Average of the skew symmetric score points, or
  - Average of Wins -/ Losses

Rb, RbOpp, s are  $n \times 1$  column vectors indexed by player. The Recursive Buchholz Rating Rb is a solution of: (Gonzalez-Diaz et al., 2011, p. 7)

- $Rb = RbOpp + s$
- $\sum Rb = 0$

Remark: although the perspective of RB and LSM are quite different the resulting order is equivalent

## Skew symmetric score systems

A score system is skew symmetric if for all possible outcomes (x, y),

- $x + y = 0$

Any traditional score system can be transformed to this form (Chebotarev, 1989, p.1104):

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} |x & 3 & .| \\ |0 & x & 1| \\ |. & 1 & x| \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{transpose}(A) = \begin{pmatrix} |x & 0 & .| \\ |3 & x & 1| \\ |. & 1 & x| \end{pmatrix}$$

$$R = (A - \text{transpose}(A)) / 2$$

$$R = \begin{pmatrix} |x & 1\frac{1}{2} & .| \\ |-1\frac{1}{2} & x & 0| \\ |. & 0 & x| \end{pmatrix}$$

## Example Provinciaal Brabants Kampioenschap PNDB 2018

Pl	Name	rating	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	+	±	N	% ±	It1	It2	It3	It4	It5	It6	Rk
1	mi Frank Teer	2208	2/3b	2/13w	1/2b	2/4w	2/5b	2/17w	2/6w	2/7b	7	7	8	43,8%	54,3%	60,0%	61,1%	62,3%	62,4%	62,8%	2
2	mf Andrew Tjon A Ong	2192	2/21w	2/6b	1/1w	2/7w	2/12b	2/4w	2/9b	2/8w	7	7	8	43,8%	54,7%	59,9%	61,6%	62,7%	63,0%	63,3%	1
3	Jan Kornilov		0/1w	1/11b	1/15b	2/16w	1/23w	2/14b		1/4b	2	1	7	7,1%	12,2%	11,4%	12,2%	11,7%	11,9%	11,7%	9
4	Piet van Erp			2/21b	1/8w	0/1b	2/10w	0/2b	2/17b	1/3w	3	1	7	7,1%	20,7%	24,1%	26,6%	27,2%	27,9%	28,0%	3
5	Luud Ector	1908	2/19w	1/12b	1/18w	2/8b	0/1w	0/6b	2/22w	2/15b	4	2	8	12,5%	17,3%	18,9%	19,8%	20,0%	20,2%	20,2%	6
6	Wiebe Cnossen	1916	1/20w	0/2w	1/11b	2/19b	2/15w	2/5w	0/1b	1/14b	3	1	8	6,3%	16,9%	15,6%	16,9%	16,2%	16,5%	16,3%	8
7	Jules Martens	2001	2/17b	2/15w	1/10w	0/2b	1/22b	1/8b	2/21w	0/1w	3	1	8	6,3%	14,7%	17,0%	19,7%	20,1%	20,8%	20,9%	4
8	Ties Slagter	1955	2/22b	2/23w	1/4b	0/5w	1/9b	1/7w	2/10w	0/2b	3	1	8	6,3%	12,1%	17,1%	18,6%	19,8%	20,2%	20,5%	5
9	Jan van den Hooff	1996	1/16w	0/10b	2/19w	2/23b	1/8w	1/12w	0/2w	2/22b	3	1	8	6,3%	8,3%	7,9%	8,8%	8,6%	9,0%	8,9%	11
10	Ton Sprangers		2/11w	2/9w	1/7b	0/12b	0/4b	2/24w	0/8b	2/18w	4	1	8	6,3%	8,3%	9,9%	10,1%	10,8%	10,8%	11,0%	10
11	Lev Gilevych		0/10b	1/3w	1/6w	2/21b	1/14w	1/22b	1/18w	2/17b	2	1	8	6,3%	3,8%	4,7%	4,3%	4,5%	4,4%	4,5%	12
12	Frank Swagemakers	1900	2/25w	1/5w	2/20b	2/10w	0/2w	1/9b			3	2	6	16,7%	18,3%	18,7%	18,6%	18,6%	18,6%	18,6%	7
13	Joop Achterstraat	1993	2/14b	0/1b	1/16w	2/20w	0/17b	1/18b	0/15b	2/23w	3	0	8	0,0%	-0,5%	-3,9%	-4,1%	-5,1%	-5,1%	-5,4%	15
14	Tanya-Marie Cnossen	1942	0/13w	2/16b	1/23b	1/22w	1/11b	0/3w	2/20b	1/6w	2	0	8	0,0%	-4,7%	-5,8%	-7,1%	-7,6%	-7,9%	-8,1%	16
15	Martien van Erp		1/18b	0/7b	1/3w	2/25w	0/6b	2/23b	2/13w	0/5w	3	0	8	0,0%	-4,8%	-2,8%	-4,5%	-3,9%	-4,4%	-4,2%	14
16	Arnold Beset		1/9b	0/14w	1/13b	0/3b	0/24w		2/25w	2/21b	2	-1	7	-7,1%	-18,0%	-21,2%	-24,0%	-24,4%	-25,2%	-25,1%	20
17	Roland Coray		0/7w	2/25b	1/22b	2/18b	2/13w	0/1b	0/4w	0/11w	3	-1	8	-6,3%	-7,1%	-4,2%	-4,2%	-3,3%	-3,4%	-3,1%	13
18	Yaroslav Gilevych		1/15w	1/19b	1/5b	0/17w	2/20b	1/13w	1/11b	0/10b	1	-1	8	-6,3%	-6,6%	-9,9%	-9,6%	-10,5%	-10,3%	-10,6%	17
19	Piet Jonkers	1817	0/5b	1/18w	0/9b	0/6w		0/21b	2/24b	2/25w	2	-2	7	-14,3%	-24,4%	-25,4%	-27,9%	-27,8%	-28,5%	-28,3%	22
20	Oleksandra Chumachenko	1914	1/6b	2/24w	0/12w	0/13b	0/18w	2/25b	0/14w		2	-2	7	-14,3%	-22,9%	-24,7%	-27,9%	-28,1%	-29,0%	-29,0%	23
21	Johan Rijnen		0/2b	0/4w	2/24b	0/11w	2/25b	2/19w	0/7b	0/16w	3	-2	8	-12,5%	-16,7%	-18,1%	-18,8%	-18,9%	-19,0%	-19,0%	19
22	Harm van der Veen		0/8w		1/17w	1/14b	1/7w	1/11w	0/5b	0/9w	0	-3	7	-21,4%	-16,0%	-15,0%	-13,5%	-12,9%	-12,6%	-12,4%	18
23	Simon Rompa	1833	2/24b	0/8b	1/14w	0/9w	1/3b	0/15w		0/13b	1	-3	7	-21,4%	-22,5%	-24,2%	-25,0%	-25,2%	-25,5%	-25,5%	21
24	Egor Kornilov		0/23w	0/20b	0/21w		2/16b	0/10b	0/19w		1	-4	6	-33,3%	-43,0%	-49,2%	-50,6%	-52,2%	-52,3%	-52,8%	24
25	Peter van Poppel		0/12b	0/17w		0/15b	0/21w	0/20w	0/16b	0/19b	0	-7	7	-50,0%	-54,5%	-60,7%	-61,1%	-62,6%	-62,5%	-63,0%	25

It is easy to check the result of the above calculation as follows:

Andrew Tjon A Ong	0,633	Frank Teer	0,627
Opponents	Rb-Rtg	Opponents	Rb-Rtg
Johan Rijnen	-0,1903	Jan Kornilov	0,1168
Wiebe Cnossen	0,1629	Joop Achterstraat	-0,0541
Frank Teer	0,6275	Andrew Tjon A Ong	0,6330
Jules Martens	0,2088	Piet van Erp	0,2798
Frank Swagemakers	0,1857	Luud Ector	0,2024
Piet van Erp	0,2798	Roland Coray	-0,0311
Jan van den Hooff	0,0885	Wiebe Cnossen	0,1629
Ties Slagter	0,2046	Jules Martens	0,2088
RbOpp average	0,1959	RbAvg	0,1898
s	0,4375 +	s	0,4375 +
RbAvg + s	0,633	Own Rb-Rtg	0,627

# Generalized Row Sum Method

## Principle

Row sum scores ( $s$ ) are calculated as the sum over  $k$  of the skew symmetric outcomes  $r_{ik}$ . The generalized row sum method is an extension of the row sum method. The idea of the generalization is to complete the missing comparisons. Central to the statistical interpretation of the generalized row sum method is the assumption that the expected value  $E(r_{ij})$  of a missing comparison is proportional to the difference of the scores  $x_i, x_j$  of the compared players  $i$  and  $j$ :

- $x_i = s_i + \sum_j E(r_{ij})$ , where  $r_{ij}$  is missing,  $s_i = \sum_k r_{ik}$  where  $r_{ik}$  is defined and
- $E(r_{ij}) = (x_j - x_i) / \gamma$ , for any positive factor  $\gamma$ , see Chebotarev, 1989, Chapter 3 Statistical model, p1105

These relationships form a system of  $n$  linear equations in  $n$  unknowns  $x_i$ . For  $\gamma = m \cdot n + \varepsilon^{-1}$  the system of equations is equivalent to:

- $x_i = \sum_k (r_{ik} + \varepsilon(x_k - x_i + r_{ik} \cdot n \cdot m))$ ,  $k = 1, \dots, n$

where

- $\varepsilon$  is a positive parameter
- $\varepsilon$  is well-chosen for given  $n$  and  $m$  if and only if  $\varepsilon^{-1} \geq m(n - 2)$
- $r_{ik} + r_{ki} = 0$ , the skew symmetric outcome between players  $i, k$
- number of players  $n > 2$ ,  $m =$  maximal number of games between any two players

Parameter  $\varepsilon$  is said to be well-chosen if for any outcome matrix  $R = (r_{ik})$  the value of its contribution to  $x_i$  is nonnegative for a maximal win and nonpositive for a maximal loss (Chebotarev, 1997, p14).

## Calculation

The generalized row sums ( $x$ ) are a solution of the set of linear equations:

- $(L + \varepsilon^{-1}I)x = \gamma s$
- $\sum x = 0$

where

- $L = (l_{ij})$  is the Laplacian matrix of the matches graph,  $I$  is the identity matrix
- $\gamma = m \cdot n + \varepsilon^{-1}$

Note that LS-ratings can be obtained as a limit of the generalized row sum calculation by setting  $\varepsilon^{-1} = 0$  and  $\gamma = 1$ .





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